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This project will investigate four historical cases of arms control noncompliance to 
gain a better understanding of why noncompliance occurs and how it might be 
prevented or reversed. The problem of noncompliance with arms control 
agreements tends to receive less attention and analysis than that devoted to the 
agendas, proposals, negotiations, and verification for these agreements. Results 
from this study should be of interest to the community of government agencies, 
nongovernmental organizations, and academic scholars that deals with arms 
control issues, as well as to members of the general public, especially in light of 
media coverage of Russian, Syrian, and potentially Iranian cheating on WMD-
related agreements.  
 
Approach:  
This research project will employ a case-study approach to gain a better 
understanding of why noncompliance occurs and how it might be prevented or 
reversed. The proposed project will examine four historical cases in which a 
country violated an arms control agreement and then one or more other countries 
attempted to enforce its terms. The project lead will employ a common set of 
questions in order to derive generalizations, with supporting examples, that can be 
used in the design of deterrents and responses to arms control violations. The 
answers to these questions are expected to provide insights and supporting 
evidence regarding conditions that encourage or discourage cheating, measures that 
deter cheating, tactics of violators, other factors that impede enforcement actions, 
and ways to compel the compliance of violators.  
